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Bridge Over Troubled Water? Migration and Social Capital 
 
Peter Nannestad, Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
 
 
The problem of integrating immigrants from non-western countries into western welfare states is 
the focus of this paper. To cope with this problem, we suggest a social capital approach by applying 
the conceptual pair of bridging social capital (BR), which connects an individual to the broader 
social structure, and bonding social capital (BO), which closely binds an individual to his narrow 
social group. By this we hope to grasp both the sunny and more shadowy side of network 
cooperation and trust in relation to the integration of immigrants. Our data on non-western 
immigrants in Denmark show a positive relationship between the levels of bridging and bonding 
capital, suggesting that bonding social capital in the immigrant group does not seem to work as an 
impediment to the establishment of the bridging social capital needed for integration. 
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Introduction 
Migration, Integration and the Modern Welfare State 
The modern welfare state is basically a formal institution that redistributes a substantial fraction of 
income among total strangers. This collective insurance system against ‘bad luck’ and inequality 
enjoys strong popular support (Fong et al. 2004). For example, the Nordic welfare states (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Finland) are supported by very large majorities of the populations.i All Nordic 
political parties with more than a marginal share of the vote are strongly in favour of keeping the 
existing welfare state largely unchanged.ii  
Large-scale migration into welfare states over the past three decades, mainly from less 
developed non-western countries, has given rise to an integration problem
 in most host countries. Until now this integration problem has remained largely unsolved. This is 
most dramatically illustrated by the emergence of so-called ‘parallel societies’ in which immigrants 
live in their own neighbourhoods, speaking their own languages and generally leading their lives 
quite isolated from the rest of society. Labour market integration has arguably failed due to the 
insufficient education and qualifications of large parts of the immigrant population, incentive 
problems, or discrimination in the labour market (SOPEMI 2002). When the level of social 
assistance is relatively high and universal, as in the Nordic welfare states, it follows that the 
financial burden of poorly integrated immigrants can be substantial (Andersen 2004; Baldwin-
Edwards 2002).  
The provision of integration can be considered a collective good for overall society in analogy 
with for instance public security (Nannestad 2004). From a societal point of view, integration is 
superior to a situation in which socially and economically marginalised immigrants linger at the 
fringes of society. However, integration requires cooperation between immigrants and natives with 
a view to bringing about this mutually beneficial situation, and this cooperation is not costless, 
either for natives or for immigrants. Thus a strong incentive for free-riding exists, since the benefits 
from integration are available to all individuals, whether or not they cooperate in bringing it about.iii 
Thus with respect to the integration of immigrants a classical collective action dilemma arises. 
The traditional means for solving collective action problems are either regulation (enforcement) 
or selective incentives, or some mix of the two (Olson, 1965). However, both encounter problems 
when it comes to the collective action problem of integration. Regulation is of limited use in the 
context of immigrant integration. The basic problem is that regulation can be applied only to what 
people do or do not do, but – at least in democratic societies – not to what they think. Thus 
behavioural discrimination against immigrants, hate speeches and similar overtly anti-immigrant 
acts can be forbidden and are indeed prohibited in most western countries. But it is not possible to 
forbid the attitudes behind such acts. Furthermore, there are limits to the regulation of individual 
behaviour in democratic countries. It would hardly be possible by means of regulation to force 
natives to live in the same neighbourhoods as immigrants, if natives do not want to live there, or to 
force native employees to stay in their workplace if they do not want to work together with 
immigrants. 
Selective incentives for cooperating in bringing about immigrant integration are generally quite 
weak in western welfare states. This is most easily seen in the case of the universalistic Nordic 
welfare state where social benefits are generous – approaching the level of the minimum wage – 
and access to social benefits depends on legal residence in the country only. As a consequence the 
individual economic gain from integration will be rather small for the typical low-skilled 
immigrant, while the cost – in terms of time and effort spent on learning the language and the 
unfamiliar mores of the new country – is most likely rather high. 
Here, we consider the potential role of social capital, which has been defined as the ability to 
co-operate in a group for the purpose of achieving a collective good (Coleman 1988). Note that this 
co-operation is voluntary and self-enforcing, thus establishing an informal institution without any 
written rules or enforcement by a third party (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). It should also be noted 
that social capital has both a ‘sunny’ and ‘dark’ side. Thus in recent research, authors such as Portes 
(1998) and Putnam (2000) have considered both positive and negative social capital, the latter 
potentially harmful to society as a whole. In the following, we will use the twin concepts of 
bridging and bonding social capital (BR/BO) in order to grasp the two sides of social capital. We 
will in this respect follow Putnam, who defines BR as open networks that are ‘outward looking and 
encompass people across diverse social cleavages’, while BO consists of ‘inward looking [networks 
that] tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups’ (Putnam 2000: 22). 
Due to poor co-operation between economists and social scientists, the social capital concept 
has until recently been the ‘missing link’ in political and economic debates. In other words, it was 
not until the beginning of the new millennium that we discovered that for far too long we had not 
taken the important production factor of social capital into consideration! It is precisely this 
‘missing link’, which may be used as one explanation for the wealth of nations in specific contexts, 
that is, in historic as well as in contemporary societies.iv Thus, social capital – grasped both in its 
bridging and bonding dimensions – may be one of the missing links in creating a coherent theory of 
integration and disintegration, combining the transaction cost approach from economics to the norm 
approach from sociology. 
Social capital, broadly understood as network cooperation based on mutual trust, can help solve 
the collective action problem of integration since it can weaken or eliminate one particular incentive 
for free-riding: the fear of ending up with the “sucker’s pay-off” if one does not free-ride, while all 
others do. As long as an individual cannot trust that others will cooperate in the collective effort, 
this individual risks a double loss by cooperating, since he has made a (costly) contribution that 
nevertheless does not result in the collective good (because the others chose to free-ride). As soon 
as there is mutual trust that everybody will do their share, this consideration becomes less 
important.  
Trust of others is probably the best indicator of social control and valuable social structures that 
facilitate cooperation (Bjørnskov 2005). In these social networks, relations are established in which 
reciprocity is enforced so that individuals make contributions to collective goods that are contingent 
on others making contributions. Such relations may be further strengthened by the enforcement of 
social norms that force contributions to collective goods. 
The less the regulatory capacity and the weaker the selective incentives for cooperation, the 
more important positive types of social capital must become for solving collective action problems. 
While the strictly regulatory capacities with respect to integration probably do not vary much across 
welfare states, selective incentives do so to a higher degree. They are clearly weakest in the most 
universalistic and most generous welfare states. For that reason social capital must be considered a 
key variable in the context of immigrant integration in the universalistic Nordic welfare state type to 
which Denmark belongs. 
 
A BR/BO Approach in Migration Studies 
The problem of integrating immigrants from non-western countries into western welfare states is 
the focus of this paper. How can parallel societies be integrated into the wider society? To cope 
with this overall question, we suggest an interdisciplinary BR/BO approach. By this we hope to 
grasp both the sunny and more shadowy side of network co-operation and trust relations. Thus we 
try to incorporate the sociological critique of the “one-sided picture of social capital” (Portes and 
Landolt 1996: 20). As we mentioned, BR can be identified as network cooperation that transcends 
group cleavages, while BO is exclusive and group-specific in nature. Both types involve trust, but 
whereas BR is based on general trust, i.e. trust in strangers, BO is based on concrete trust, i.e. trust 
in people you already know. BO in the form of exclusive friendship and kinship groups often 
implies positive externalities, while excessive BO in the form of ‘superglued’ groups such as the 
mafia, Al-Qaida and KKK involves negative societal outcomes. Hence, we propose three types of 
social capital: BR+, BO+ and BO–. 
Building on this conceptual approach, our research question can basically be defined as follows: 
how do bridging and bonding social capital affect the integration of immigrants? More specifically 
we ask if the poor integration of non-western immigrants in Denmark can be related to low levels of 
bridging social capital (BR) in this group. If this turns out to be the case, we further ask if this has 
something to do with the level and type of bonding social capital (BO) in the immigrant groups. 
Does bonding social capital crowd out bridging social capital, i.e. is it BO-? Or is there just too little 
positive bonding social capital (BO+) to raise the level of bridging social capital sufficiently?  To 
our knowledge, such an approach to the integration of immigrants, based on our new social capital 
database, has not yet been undertaken.  
In the next section, we start by elaborating theoretically upon the BR/BO distinction, focusing 
mainly on BO+. We present examples from the migration literature of the formation of BO+ and 
then suggest how BO+ arguably may affect BR positively through the channel of voluntary 
associations. In the section that follows, we discuss our collection of data and some methodological 
problems. Next, we empirically analyse the relationship between BR and BO, as well as the 
prevailing type of BO (BO+/BO-), using our survey of social capital in five non-western immigrant 
groups in Denmark. In the final section, we discuss some policy recommendations. 
 
The BR/BO Framework 
Social Capital as ‘Cutting Both Ways’ 
The recent BR/BO distinction certainly takes into account the important critique of a ‘dominant 
celebratory view of social capital’ since the 1990s (Portes and Landolt 1996: 21) and a general 
tendency to neglect the downside or dark side of social capital, which has been raised by 
sociologists.  
Until now, the social capital approach has been rare within migration studies. Portes (1998, 
2000) has applied research on migration to show that, first, social capital has a negative side; and 
second, that social capital explanations often are teleological, implying that one should always look 
for other, alternative explanations (the ‘spurious effect’ argument, cf. Portes 2000). At the macro 
level, Hammar et al. (1997), Massey (1998) and Schiff (1998) see social capital as a good which 
influences migration patterns, without however distinguishing between different qualities of social 
capital (BR/BO). 
Portes (1998) was the first to make the distinction between positive and negative types of social 
capital. Positive social capital derived from social control is typically found in the form of what 
Portes (op.cit.: 10) calls ‘rule enforcement’, ‘bounded solidarity’ and ‘enforceable trust’ (see also 
Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). However, Portes (1998) argues that social capital cuts both ways, 
meaning that negative types of network cooperation also exist, for example in networks where costs 
tend to exceed profits for individual members through loss of personal freedom or possibilities for 
upward social mobility. 
We find that the recognition of social capital as ‘cutting both ways’ is crucial. This idea deeply 
roots in the sociological theories of Durkheim and Weber, focusing on the moral character of 
economic transactions within a group. For example, Durkheim ([1893] 1984: 162) wrote in his 
analysis of the so-called noncontractual elements of contract: “The contract is not sufficient by 
itself, but is only possible because of the regulation of contracts, which is of social origin”. This 
supports his seminal idea of an evolutionary leap from ‘mechanical solidarity’, belonging to pre-
modern societies where members share working functions and norms (i.e. BO), to ‘organic 
solidarity’ belonging to modern societies based on formal contracts between different occupational 
groups (involving formation of both BO and BR, in our terminology) (ibid.). Likewise, Weber 
([1922] 1947) distinguished between ‘formal’ and ‘substantial’ rationality when considering 
economic transactions. Transactions consistent with a formal rationality are based on universal 
norms and inclusive networks and are therefore not directed by narrow group interests. Transactions 
consistent with a substantial rationality are, in contrast, directed by group norms and narrow group 
interests. The purpose in the latter is typically that of establishing or maintaining monopoly status in 
the market. Weber’s overall point is that individual group members are capable of suppressing their 
own egoistic wants here and now, in anticipation of future and lasting advantages, that is, future net 
gains, from undertaking social action (ibid). Besides, the BR-BO distinction can be traced in other 
influential social theories, such as Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft and, more recently, 
Granovetter’s strong and weak ties (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004). 
Still, we think Portes (1998) has carried this discussion a step further when he argues that, first, 
social capital also may be harmful to society and, second, that the distinction between positive and 
negative types of social capital can be very subtle indeed. 
At the individual level, the processes alluded to by the concept [of social capital] cut both 
ways. Social ties can bring about greater control over wayward behaviour and provide 
privileged access to resources; they can also restrict individual freedoms, and bar outsiders 
from gaining access to the same resources through particularistic preferences [Portes 1998: 
21]. 
This is so because a group of people – say, a group of Puerto Ricans in New York, or a Turkish 
community in Brussels – can get to know and trust each other ‘too much’, not allowing other people 
access to their network (what Putnam termed ‘superglue’). Thus, the radius of exchange of 
information, knowledge and reciprocal services is restricted, leading to negative externalities and 
zero-sum games (BO–). In worst cases, such group isolationist strategies result in symbolic violence 
between groups of insiders and outsiders (‘us’ and ‘them’). Not infrequently, this involves 
marginalisation of social groups, reinforced by prejudices and group isolation, such as unemployed 
urban migrants in peripheral rural Denmark (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). Even more 
dramatically, it manifests itself in riots and killings as in the case of enduring conflicts between 
Hindus and Muslims in India (Varshney 2002). The migration literature is particularly rich on cases 
of good provision within ethnic networks cutting both ways. 
In most immigrant studies, social capital is seen as belonging exclusively to a certain immigrant 
group and being used ‘against’ the surrounding society, implying both positive and negative 
outcomes – that  is, BO+ and BO– in our terminology (e.g. Portes and Stepick 1985; Portes and 
Zhou 1993; Zhou and Bankston 1994; Ooka and Wellman 2000; Favell 2003; Hagan et al. 2005). 
While being fully aware of the negative dimensions of immigrant networks, in this paper we will 
draw attention to their positive dimensions, or potentialities. This is in line with a major part of the 
immigrant literature, which often focuses on types of prevailingly BO+. 
With respect to empirical evidence, BO– has been detected on a large scale in eastern Europe. 
For example, Stephenson (2001) notes that social capital works in negative and positive ways in 
post-communist Russia, supporting groups of children on the streets of Moscow, but also enabling 
and supporting the Russian mafia. The negative social capital heritage can be traced to the 
communist era, as in Poland (Chloupkova et al. 2003) and Romania (Almond 1991; Coplin and 
O’Leary 2001; Ivanes 2001; Ledeneva 1998), but harmful bonding social capital can also be traced 
historically in countries with democratic traditions, such as Denmark in the decades following 
World War II (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). 
By now the distinction between ‘good’ bridging and ‘bad’ bonding social capital is in 
widespread usage in applications of a social capital framework. We argue, however, that the 
theoretical framework could be sharpened by using a simple and operational distinction between a 
positive, bridging type of social capital (BR+) and two types of bonding social capital (BO+ and 
BO–). While bridging social capital consists of inter-group networks, cooperation and trust that 
transcend group cleavages, bonding social capital resides in intra-group networks, cooperation and 
trust of an excluding and, at times, economically harmful nature. Normally BR is identified with 
inclusive, outward-oriented relationships (“lubricants”), while BO is considered exclusive and 
inward-oriented (“glue”). 
While we accept the characterisation of bridging social capital as “good” social capital from the 
point of view of society, we suggest that bonding social capital need not always be “bad” social 
capital. We want to keep open the possibility that under certain circumstances bonding social 
capital may facilitate the development of bridging capital. To the extent that this happens, we call 
the bonding social capital ‘good’ as well (BO+). To the extent that bonding social capital crowds 
out or destroys bridging social capital we call that type of bonding social capital “bad” social capital 
(BO-). Linking our terminology to Portes’ (1998) important findings within migration studies, we 
may say that BR only cuts one way, while BO cuts both ways, leading to varying positive and 
negative outcomes at all levels. 
Add to this the simultaneous existence of negative and positive types of social capital in a 
society, and even as two qualities within the same network (Portes 1998: 20), and it becomes clear 
that we are faced with various mixes of BR/BO+ –.  
 
From BO+ to BR 
Both the ‘family’ theory and the BO+ ‘group solidarity’ theory have been promoted by one of the 
most influential authors in the early formation of a social capital research agenda during the 1980s 
and 1990s, James Coleman (1988, 1990). Coleman stressed the importance of common, intra-group 
norms and closure, as well as family resources.v Granovetter (1995) also states that it is the level of 
group solidarity that gives immigrants and other minorities advantages in the construction of 
enterprise. Similarly, Portes and Zhou (1993: 96) point to the advantages obtained by children of 
non-white immigrants, who remain ‘securely ensconced in their coethnic community [enabling 
them to capitalise] on otherwise unavailable material and moral resources’. A cultural argument is 
also advanced by Waldinger (1995), who finds that success in adaptive strategies among Caribbean 
and Korean Americans, and failure among African Americans, can be explained by differences in 
ethnic organisation. Using the Vietnamese case, Zhou and Bankston (1994: 841) explain successful 
integration as resulting from ‘a coherent complex of immigrant cultural orientations and the 
significant positive influence of this cultural complex on the adaption of Vietnamese youth’. In our 
terminology, they identify a BO+ building process, which functions as a safeguard against 
formation of harmful BO–: 
[Ethnic] social integration creates a form of social capital that enables an immigrant family 
to receive ongoing support and direction from other families and from the religious and 
social associations of the ethnic group. Consequently, community standards are established 
and reinforced among group members who may otherwise assimilate into an underclass 
subculture (op. cit.: 842).    
Nee and Sanders (2001) have proposed an interesting ‘forms-of-capital’ approach, which aims 
to shed light on the importance of various mixes of financial, human-cultural and social capital 
among immigrant groups, as important determinants for careers. However, in contrast to cases of 
BO+ based on ethnic solidarity cited above they emphasis the role of the family. Thus, immigrants 
‘with the lowest stock of family capital rely more on social ties embedded in the ethnic community 
as a substitute for the social support provided by a family. These social connections more often lead 
to jobs [in the ethnic economy] characterized by low wages and poor working conditions’(op.cit.: 
407). In contrast, more independent families rich in human and financial capital are better equipped 
to participate in the open economy and establish inter-ethnic networks, i.e. BR in our terminology.    
Besides getting access to resources and jobs, the positive side of BO may also, as Putnam 
argues (1993), lead to BR due to participation in voluntary organisations. One example could be the 
social interaction in a sports club where friendship ties are formed. This regular face-to-face 
interaction in the sports club arguably facilitates BO+, which again is carried out into society and 
thereby transformed to BR. In other words, the positive specific experience with other people in a 
voluntary organisation will ‘spill over’ into overall society and eventually enhance economic 
growth due to reduced transaction and monitoring costs in the economy. 
 
Data: Bonding and Bridging Social Capital in Five Non-Western Immigrant Groups in 
Denmark 
Data and Measurements 
In the following, we present survey data from Denmark’s SoCap (2005) project as collected in April 
– May 2004. This new survey allows us to highlight the levels of BR and BO and the relationships 
between these measures for five different ethnic groups in Denmark. We will measure social capital 
based on surveys of trust, friendship patterns and voluntary association memberships, both within 
and outside own groups. 
The data were collected by bilingual interviewers using a mixture of phone and personal (face-
to-face) interviews. The respondents consisted of a representative sample from the five largest 
groups of non-western immigrants and refugees in Denmark (see Table 1), defined according to the 
criteria developed by Statistics Denmark (SoCap, 2005). 
   
Table 1 about here 
 
 Using bilingual interviewers from the respondents’ own ethnic groups is likely to have resulted 
in a higher proportion of completed interviews. It may also have enhanced the reliability of the 
responses since the respondents had no reason to reflect on how their answers would tally with 
Danish norms and expectations. Consistency checks were performed wherever possible and did not 
indicate problems. 
 
Measuring Bridging and Bounding Social Capital 
We approach the measurement of social capital in the five non-western immigrant groups in three 
ways, drawing on the responses to three different clusters of questions. These three clusters of 
questions represent three different instruments that have been suggested in the literature and used 
for measuring social capital. 
The first cluster of questions deals with trust. The respondents were asked if they thought one 
could usually trust members of their own ethnic group in Denmark, or if one could not be too 
careful in dealing with them. We consider the responses to this question a measure of bonding 
social capital. Furthermore the respondents were asked the same question with respect to four other 
groups – all outgroups from the perspective of the respondent, although to varying degrees: other 
immigrants and refugees now living in Denmark, native Danes, Danish Jews, and Danish Catholics. 
We consider the responses to these questions to be a measure of bridging social capital. 
The second set of questions deals with friendship ties. The respondents were asked if they had 
many, quite a number, a few, or no Danish friends. We consider the responses to this question still 
another measure of bridging social capital. The respondents were also asked if they had many, quite 
a number, a few, or no friends among other immigrants and refugees in Denmark. We consider the 
responses to this question a measure of bonding social capital. 
The third set of questions deals with participation in voluntary associations. In his seminal study 
of social capital in Italy, Putnam (1993) has emphasised the importance of voluntary associations in 
building social capital. Voluntary associations contribute to building social capital mainly through 
the experience of mutually beneficial cooperation and the development of trust from this 
experience. Hence the density of memberships in voluntary associations, sometimes called 
Putnam’s instrument, provides an indication of the amount of social capital in individuals, in 
groups, or in society as a whole. Here, we differentiate between memberships in voluntary 
associations with both native and immigrant members and memberships in voluntary associations 
with only immigrant members. We consider the former an indicator of bridging (BR) and the latter 
an indicator of bonding social capital (BO). 
In analysing the responses to these three clusters of questions we start out at the group level. 
This allows us to assess the level of different types of social capital in the five immigrant groups. In 
order to determine if bonding social capital is BO+ or BO- we have to move to the individual level. 
We consider bonding social capital BO+ if it correlates positively with bridging social capital 
across individuals and BO- if it correlates negatively. If there is no significant correlation, we 
cannot decide if bonding social capital is BO+ or BO-.  
 
Response Set? 
In the empirical analyses we shall compare the respondents’ trust in their own group and in various 
outgroups, the density of their friendship ties with Danes and with other immigrants and refugees, 
and the density of their memberships in intra- and in inter-ethnic voluntary associations. The 
validity of the outcomes of these comparisons depends critically on the absence of response set 
patterns in the recorded answers. If the respondents – or many of them – automatically answered the 
relevant questions in the same way, for instance by saying that they had ‘many’ Danish friends just 
because they had said earlier in the interview that they had many friends among immigrants and 
refugees, the associations found would just be artefacts. 
We cannot rule out response set problems with absolute certainty. It is possible, however, to 
check for indications that they may be occurring. Here we can take advantage of a variable the 
values of which are not determined by the respondent but by the interviewer. This variable is 
Danish language proficiency. It seems reasonable to assume that there must be a relationship 
between Danish language proficiency and a respondent’s number of Danish friends. Furthermore, 
this relationship should be stronger than the relationship between Danish language proficiency and 
a respondent’s number of friends among immigrants and refugees in Denmark. Finding such a 
pattern would indicate the absence of response set problems with the answers to the friendship 
questions. In fact the expected pattern can be found: Danish language proficiency is much more 
strongly correlated with the number of friendships with native Danes (Spearman’s ρ = 0.56, t = 
25.97, p= 0.00) than with the number of friendships with immigrants and refugees (Spearman’s ρ = 
0.17, t = 6.76, p= 0.00).  
By the same logic one should expect the number of memberships of inter-ethnic voluntary 
associations to be more strongly correlated with Danish language proficiency than the number of 
memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations. Again, we find this pattern in the data: the 
correlation is stronger and statistically more reliable for inter-ethnic voluntary associations 
(Spearman’s ρ = 0.21, t = 8.24, p= 0.00) than for intra-ethnic ones (Spearman’s ρ = 0.05, t = 2.06, 
p= 0.04). Again this meaningful pattern would be difficult to explain if we were to assume some 
built-in automatic relation between how the respondents have answered the two sets of questions 
concerning membership in intra- and in inter-ethnic voluntary associations. 
With respect to the trust question, Nannestad and Svendsen (2005) have shown that trust in 
Danes is more strongly dependent on trust in the even-handedness of Danish institutions in their 
dealing with native Danes and with immigrants than is trust in other immigrants. This finding 
makes sense, since institutions that are even-handed in their dealings with native Danes and 
immigrants reduce the risk created by trusting Danes, but not necessarily the risk created by trusting 
other immigrants. Again, this pattern would be hard to account for if we assumed that many 
respondents indicated trust in native Danes just because they had indicated trust in other immigrants 
and refugees. 
Given these results, we can be confident in ruling out response set as the cause of the 
correlations reported in the next section. 
 
Empirical Results 
In the following we present empirical results on the level of bridging and bonding social capital in 
the respondents from five non-western immigrant groups in Denmark and on the relationship 
between the two types of social capital. 
 
The Trust Questions 
Table 2 shows the patterns in the responses to the trust questions.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The results suggest that the level of bonding social capital is surprisingly low with the Turkish, 
the Pakistani and the Yugoslav groups, where less than one half of the respondents indicate trust in 
members of their own ethnic group in Denmark. At the other extreme the Somalis indicate high 
levels of bonding social capital as measured by the trust question, with 80 per cent expressing trust 
in other Somalis in Denmark. The Palestinian group occupies an intermediate position with about 
one half of the respondents expressing trust in other Palestinians in Denmark. 
With respect to the level of bridging social capital, Table 2 exhibits two somewhat contradictory 
trends. On the one hand, trust in Danes is at about the same level as trust in the respondents’ own 
group, or even exceeds it in the case of Turks, Pakistanis, Palestinians and Yugoslavs, while it is 
considerably lower with Somalis. On the other hand the level of trust in outgroups other than native 
Danes tends to be lower than the level of trust in the respondents’ own group, except for in the case 
of the Yugoslavs. 
Table 3 demonstrates the patterns above in a slightly different way by ranking outgroups 
according to which are most widely trusted (left panel), and which non-western immigrant groups 
trust outgroups most (right panel). Danes form the most trusted outgroup (53.5 per cent) followed 
by own group (49.2 per cent) whereas Danish Jews are trusted by the smallest proportion (36.1 per 
cent). Somalis are the most trusting immigrant group (66.2 per cent), followed by Palestinians (52.2 
per cent), with Turks at the bottom (33.1 per cent). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Tables 2 and 3 do not suggest that bonding social capital – trust in members of the respondents’ 
own ethnic groups – crowds out bridging social capital, at least as far as trust in native Danes is 
concerned. Indeed, the percentage of respondents trusting Danes and trusting members of their own 
ethnic groups is rather similar and close to 50 per cent. The question is, however, to what extent 
those who trust members of their own group and those who trust Danes are actually the same or 
different respondents. This can be seen in Table 4 which gives the individual level correlations 
between trusting members of one’s own group and trusting various outgroups, including Danes. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The tetrachoric correlations in Table 4 strongly indicate that respondents who express trust in 
their own ethnic group also tend to express trust in members of outgroups and that those who do not 
trust outgroups are likely not to trust their own group either. This means that trust in one’s own 
ethnic group is BO+. It is certainly bonding social capital, but it would seem to have a positive 
spillover effect with respect to trust in outgroups, that is, BR.  
Thus from the perspective of social capital as a means of solving the collective action problem 
of integration, the problem seems not to be that immigrants in Denmark hold too much bonding 
social capital at the expense of the bridging social capital that is needed. Rather, the problem would 
seem to be that they hold too little bonding social capital (trust in members of their own group) 
which can spill over into bridging social capital (trust in members of outgroups, especially native 
Danes). 
The Friendship Questions 
The overall distribution of the answers to the questions on friendships with native Danes and with 
other immigrants and refugees in Denmark is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 indicates that immigrants tend to hold more bonding than bridging social capital when 
social capital is measured by the number of friendship ties. The proportion of respondents reporting 
‘many’ or ‘quite a number’ of friends among immigrants and refugees in Denmark significantly 
exceeds the proportion reporting ‘many’ or ‘quite a number of’ friend among native Danes. The 
proportion of respondents reporting ‘a few’ or no friends among immigrants and refugees in 
Denmark is significantly smaller than the proportion reporting ‘a few’ or no friends among native 
Danes. 
In order to determine how friendship ties with other immigrants and refugees (BO) and 
friendship ties with native Danes (BR) are related, and hence what type of bonding social capital 
friendship with other immigrants and refugees represents, we need to turn to Table 5. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
The interesting thing to notice in Table 5 is that having Danish friends and having friends 
among other immigrants is strongly correlated. Thus ethnic friendship ties are not crowding out 
friendship ties to Danes - rather to the contrary.  
Largely the same picture emerges when we examine the relationship between having many 
Danish friends and having many friends among other immigrants across our five immigrant groups. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 As can be seen in Table 6, immigrant groups with an above-average percentage reporting many 
immigrant friends (the Turks and the Ex-Yugoslavs) also report an above-average percentage of 
many Danish friendships, while the Pakistanis and the Somalis are below average in both respects. 
With the Palestinian group the picture is a little less clear. This group is lower than the Turkish and 
the Ex-Yugoslav group with respect to both the percentage reporting many friendships with other 
immigrants and the percentage reporting many friendships with Danes. Thus there is a clear 
tendency for differences between the five immigrant groups with respect to the amount of bonding 
social capital (percentage reporting many friendships with other immigrants) to also appear in their 
amount of bonding social capital (percentage reporting many friendships with Danes). 
If we consider ethnic friendship ties as bonding (BO) and friendship ties with Danes as bridging 
social capital (BR), then we can interpret Table 5 and Table 6 as suggesting a spill-over effect from 
BO to BR, meaning that ethnic friendship ties are BO+. 
As with the trust questions, from an integration perspective the problem seems not to be that 
immigrants in Denmark hold too much bonding social capital at the expense of desirable bridging 
social capital. Rather, the problem would seem to be that they hold too little bonding social capital 
(friendships with other immigrants and refugees), thus limiting the potential for a spill-over into 
bridging social capital (friendships with native Danes). 
 
Putnam’s Instrument 
Finally we turn to an analysis of the measures provided by Putnam’s instrument. We begin by 
examining the levels of bridging and bonding capital, cf. Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
At first sight Figure 2 would seem to suggest that the immigrants in question possess more 
bridging than bonding social capital. After all, the proportion of respondents reporting no 
memberships at all in intra-ethnic voluntary associations is significantly higher than the proportion 
reporting no memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations. Furthermore, the proportions 
reporting one or several memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations consistently exceed the 
proportions reporting one or several memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations. 
This interpretation may be somewhat misleading, however. On closer inspection of the data, it is 
evident that the difference between the proportions reporting memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic 
associations, respectively, is driven by membership in one single group of (inter-ethnic) 
associations only. These are the trade unions. From the perspective of bridging social capital, trade 
union membership is not very likely to contribute much to building bridging social capital by 
immigrants, even though trade unions are (at least in a formal sense) voluntary associations and 
have both natives and immigrants as members. The main reason is that to most members trade 
unions are ‘wallet associations’, where normally little interaction between the rank-and-file takes 
place. For that reason, little building of trust in native co-members can be expected. If we exclude 
trade union membership, the pattern of memberships in voluntary associations changes rather 
dramatically. 
Now the proportion not reporting any memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations 
exceeds the proportion not reporting any memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations by a 
significant margin. Moreover, the proportions reporting one or several memberships in intra-ethnic 
voluntary associations consistently exceed the proportions reporting memberships in inter-ethnic 
ones. Thus according to Putnam’s instrument we now find more bonding than bridging capital in 
the five non-western immigrant groups surveyed. 
The data on memberships in voluntary associations so far suggest two main conclusions 
concerning the social capital of immigrants in Denmark. In the first place, the stock of social capital 
possessed by immigrants in Denmark is rather low when measured by Putnam’s instrument, and 
this holds true for bonding and bridging social capital alike. This is clearly brought out in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
In the second place, there are no signs of bonding social capital (membership(s) in intra-ethnic 
voluntary associations) crowding out bridging social capital (membership(s) in inter-ethnic 
voluntary associations) – or vice versa. This situation would have been implied if high levels of 
membership in intra-ethnic voluntary associations had been found to occur with low levels of 
membership in inter-ethnic ones. This, however, is not what the data show. 
This conclusion is confirmed when looking at the relationship between memberships in intra- 
and inter-ethnic voluntary associations at the individual level. As can be seen in Tables 8, 9 and 10, 
there is a positive individual-level relationship between the numbers of memberships in intra- and 
inter-ethnic voluntary associations. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Table 9 about here 
 
Table 10 about here 
 
However, Tables 8 and 9 also reveal that the positive and significant relationship between 
numbers of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations is strongly driven by the 
high number of respondents reporting no memberships in either one of the two types of voluntary 
associations. If we omit respondents who report no memberships in either intra- or inter-ethnic 
voluntary associations and exclude membership in trade unions, the relationship between numbers 
of memberships in the two types of voluntary associations vanishes. This implies that membership 
in intra-ethnic associations does not affect the likelihood of a membership in one or more inter-
ethnic associations, and vice versa, as soon as we disregard respondents who are not members of 
any kind of voluntary association.  
But it should also be noted that there is still no evidence that intra-ethnic association 
membership is crowding out membership in inter-ethnic associations. A crowding out effect would 
be indicated by a significant negative relationship between the numbers of memberships in intra- 
and inter-ethnic voluntary associations, respectively. 
This conclusion is confirmed if we look at the differences between the average numbers of 
memberships in inter- and intra-ethnic voluntary associations between our five immigrant groups. 
 
Table 11 about here 
 
As can be seen the Turkish group has an above-average participation in both intra- and inter-
ethnic voluntary associations, which suggests a positive relationship. The Somali group has below 
average participation in both intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations, which likewise suggests 
a positive relationship. The Pakistani group is above average with respect to memberships in inter-
ethnic voluntary associations, but on average with respect to memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary 
associations, suggesting no relationship between memberships in the two types of voluntary 
associations. Thus the results from these three groups suggest that the amount of bonding social 
capital, when measured by memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations, is either positively 
related to the amount of bonding social capital, measured as memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary 
associations, or that there is at least no negative relationship between bonding and bridging social 
capital. 
However, the results for the Palestinian group and the group of Ex-Yugoslavs might seem to 
suggest a different conclusion. The Palestinian group is below average with respect to memberships 
in inter-ethnic and above average with respect to memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary 
associations. With the group of Ex-Yugoslavs, the pattern is reversed. This group is above average 
with respect to memberships in inter- and below average with respect to memberships in intra-
ethnic voluntary associations. But with the Palestinian group the average number of memberships in 
intra-ethnic voluntary associations is not significantly greater than the overall average (p>0.10). 
With the group of Ex-Yugoslavs the difference between their average numbers of memberships in 
intra-ethnic voluntary associations and the overall average is just marginally significant (p=0.10). 
Thus the results for these two groups should most appropriately be interpreted as suggesting no 
relationship between the amounts of bridging and bonding social capital, when social capital is 
measured by memberships in voluntary intra- and inter-ethnic associations. 
In conclusion, the analysis of social capital of immigrants in Denmark based on Putnam’s 
instrument (membership in voluntary associations) indicates that their bonding social capital, 
measured as the individual respondent’s number of memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary 
associations, does not appear to be negative bonding social capital (BO–). At best, it may even 
represent a kind of positive bonding social capital (BO+) with a positive spill over into bridging 
social capital (BR). At worst, the amount of bonding social capital as indicated by Putnam‘s 
instrument has no reliable negative effect on the amount of bridging social capital of the 
immigrants. 
From the perspective of integration, then, membership in intra-ethnic voluntary associations 
should not be considered a problem in its own right, even though it constitutes bonding social 
capital. Since the amount of bonding social capital, as measured by Putnam’s instrument, has turned 
out to have either no relationship, or perhaps even a positive relationship, with bridging social 
capital, concerns about immigrants retreating into their own system of ethnic voluntary institutions 
cordoned off from associations in the host society seem largely unfounded. Bonding social capital, 
as indicated by memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations, is not necessarily an obstacle to 
the acquisition of the bridging social capital needed for integration. Rather, it is the immigrants’ 
generally low level of social capital of any kind revealed by Putnam’s instrument that could be a 
cause for concern. 
 
Building Bridges over Troubled Waters 
It is important that isolated networks be better integrated through building bridging social capital in 
positive-sum games. If not, we risk the formation of excessive bonding in the form of one-sided, 
intra-communal engagement (Varshney 2002:12), within parallel immigrant societies. This leads to 
a fragile social order in isolated communities, which can easily be destabilized, for example by 
rumours and tensions from the outside world, perhaps reinforced by public media. This might lead 
to symbolic violence and, in extreme cases, physical violence – as in the already mentioned case of 
conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. Similar cases have emerged in European 
immigration countries, for example the murder of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in 2004, 
the recent riots in Paris (October-November 2005) or the cartoon controversy caused by the 
publication of 12 cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper (30 September 2005). 
Hence, while our data and results indicate that the situation in Denmark at present is generally 
far from the situation characterising the French suburbs in 2005, this does not guarantee that the 
situation will remain so forever, or that it will develop of its own accord in a positive direction. We 
have found bonding social capital in five immigrant groups in Denmark to be largely positive 
(BO+) in the sense of being positively related to bridging social capital (BR). But this may 
conceivably change, and we have limited knowledge about when and how this might happen. 
Thus building bridges between groups becomes essential before they become increasingly 
superglued. Parallel societies should not only be seen as private, ‘monopolised’ network resources 
that are not being effectively exploited by the rest of society. They might lead to a number of 
societal problems such as corruption, black markets, criminality, decrease in generalised trust, 
deteriorating human capital and, ultimately, economic backlash. But, as our findings indicate, they 
can also be building blocks in the acquisition of bridging social capital. 
One way of building bridges could be to facilitate voluntary organisations, as they may secure 
regular interaction between different ethnic or social groups. (e.g. Putnam 2000; Warren 2001; Giri 
2002; Varshney 2002; Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). 
Numerous historical examples such as the voluntary dairy movement in Denmark or sports hall 
buildings suggest that organisations which appeal to members across group cleavages and are 
situated in decentralized meeting-places owned by the members themselves, may function as 
platforms for integration. When prejudices and myths about other groups are contested and where 
information and services are exchanged for mutual benefit, the likelihood that BO is transformed 
into BR is increased significantly. 
 
Conclusion 
Economists and other social scientists have increasingly come to focus on social capital as a means 
for solving collective action dilemmas. Here, social capital may be one of the missing links in 
creating a coherent theory to understand and measure social integration. Thus, we wanted to adapt 
our social capital approach to a new sociological setting: immigrant groups. This motivated us to 
avoid what has been termed the one-sided picture of social capital, meaning a focus on solely 
beneficial, inter-group social capital. Therefore we applied the recent inventions of bridging and 
bonding social capital (BR/BO). In line with Putnam, we identified BR as networks that transcend 
group cleavages, while BO is much more exclusive and, at times, aggressively exclusive. We 
argued that both types involve trust, but whereas BR is based on trust of strangers, BO is based on 
trust of people who are known. Thus, BO in the form of friendship and kinship groups often imply 
positive societal outcomes, while excessive BO in the form of ‘superglued’ groups such as the 
mafia, Al-Qaida and KKK involve negative outcomes. Accordingly, we proposed three types of 
social capital: BR+, BO+, BO–. 
Building on this conceptual approach, our research question can basically be defined as follows: 
how does bridging and bonding social capital affect the integration of immigrants?  Overall, in line 
with a major part of the sociological immigrant literature, our results call attention to what appears 
to be a surprisingly great potential for BO+ and BR among Danish immigrant groups from non-
western countries. Such a positive relationship between the levels of bridging and bonding capital in 
these groups suggests that bonding social capital does not work as an impediment to the 
development of the bridging social capital needed for integration. 
However, this conclusion should not invite complacency. Rather, in the short run, we would 
recommend the encouragement of open voluntary organisations as a means of inter-group bridging. 
These associations should be situated in decentralized, shared meeting-places securing regular face 
to face interaction across group cleavages, and hence aiding the potential transformation of BO to 
BR. 
More theoretical and empirical work is needed if we are to make the bridging/bonding approach 
helpful in studies of immigrant parallel societies. How do we establish the optimal mix between 
BO+ and BR, for example? Such challenges do indeed call for sophisticated quantitative and 
qualitative analysis in future research. 
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 Figure 1 Friendships with native Danes and with other immigrants and refugees in Denmark 
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Figure 2. Memberships in voluntary associations 
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Figure 3  Memberships in voluntary associations, excluding trade unions 
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Table 1  The immigrant respondents in the sample 
 
Group Group size 
in 
population 
Group 
size in 
sample 
Composi
tion 
Original 
type of 
migration 
Migration 
onset 
Religious 
composition 
Turks 53.465 302 Turks 
and 
Kurds 
Guest 
workers 
1960’s Muslim 
Pakistanis 19.049 300 Pakistani Guest 
workers 
1960’s Muslim 
Somalis 17.849 276 Somalis Refugees 1990’s Muslim 
Palestinians 21.202 322 Mainly 
from 
Lebanon 
Refugees 1980’s Muslim 
Ex-
Yugoslavs 
38.314 303 Serbs 
and 
Bosnians 
Serbs: 
guest 
workers 
Bosnians: 
refugees 
1960’s 
 
1990’s 
Christian and 
Muslim 
 
Source: Nannestad and Svendsen (2005). 
Table 2  Trust in own group, other immigrants, native Danes, Danish 
Jews and Danish Catholics (per cent of valid answers, number of 
observations in parentheses) 
 
 
 Trust in Trust in  
 
Group 
 
Own group 
Other 
immigrants Danes 
Jews in 
Denmark 
Catholics in 
Denmark 
Turks  34.5 (296) 30.6 (294) 36.1 (294) 31.8 (285) 32.6 (288) 
Pakistanis  39.2 (286) 33.2 (280) 38.3 (282) 26.7 (258) 28.8 (253) 
Somalis  80.2 (267) 70.5 (264) 71.9 (263) 48.1 (241) 58.1 (248) 
Palestinians  52.6 (314) 48.1 (289) 69 (300) 30 (190) 53.1 (193) 
Yugoslavs  41.4 (268) 34.7 (248) 53.1 (258) 45.2 (208) 51.1 (231) 
Source: SoCap (2005). 
Table 3  Groups most trusted and most trusting (weighted averages) in 
per cent 
 
Trust in 
Average pct. of all 
respondents trusting 
 Average pct. in respondent group 
trusting at least one outgroup 
Danes 53.5 Somalis 66.2 
Own group 49.2 Palestinians 52.2 
Catholics 43.8 Yugoslavs 45.0 
Immigrants 43.2 Pakistani 33.5 
Jews 36.1 Turks 33.1 
Source: SoCap (2005). 
Table 4  Tetrachoric correlations between trust in own ethnic group and 
trust in other groups 
 
Group 
Other immigrants 
in Denmark 
Native 
Danes Danish Jews 
Danish 
Catholics 
Turks 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Pakistanis 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.97 
Somalis 0.89 0.84 0.82 0.83 
Palestinians .96 0.74 0.86 0.79 
Ex-Yugoslavs 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 
All 0.97 0.90 0.92 0.90 
 
Table 5  Individual-level relationships between friendships with other 
immigrants and refugees and friendships with native Danes (in per cent) 
 
 
Immigrant 
friends 
Danish 
friends: 
Many 
Danish friends: 
Quite a number 
Danish friends: 
A few 
Danish 
friends: 
None Row 
       
Count Many 64 68 92 40 264 
Column Percent  26.02 19.77 17.83 10.10  
Row Percent  24.24 25.76 34.85 15.15  
Total Percent  4.26 4.53 6.13 2.66 17.58 
       
Count Quite a 
number 
65 160 197 82 504 
Column Percent  26.42 46.51 38.18 20.71  
Row Percent  12.90 31.75 39.09 16.27  
Total Percent  4.33 10.65 13.12 5.46 33.56 
       
Count A few 70 61 174 142 447 
Column Percent  28.46 17.73 33.72 35.86  
Row Percent  15.66 13.65 38.93 31.77  
Total Percent  4.66 4.06 11.58 9.45 29.76 
       
Count None 47 55 53 132 287 
Column Percent  19.11 15.99 10.27 33.33  
Row Percent  16.38 19.16 18.47 45.99  
Total Percent  3.13 3.66 3.53 8.79 19.11 
       
Count All Groups 246 344 516 396 1502 
Total Percent  16.38 22.90 34.35 26.36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6  Friendships with other immigrants and refugees and friendships 
with native Danes (in per cent), by immigrant group 
 
 
 Turks Pakistanis Somalis Palestinians 
 
Immigrant 
friends 
Danish 
friends 
Immigrant 
friends 
 
Danish 
friends 
Immigrant 
friends 
Danish 
friends 
 
Immigrant 
friends 
 
Danish 
friends 
         
Many 24.83 20.59 14.67 6.67 14.86 10.14 12.73 17.08 
Quite a 
number 
32.78 22.19 39.33 18.00 37.32 26.81 33.54 14.60 
A few 23.51 34.11 39.00 45.33 23.55 30.80 37.58 31.37 
None 18.87 23.18 7.00 30.00 24.28 32.25 16.15 36.96 
(n) (302)  (300)  (276)  (322)  
         
 
 Ex-Yugoslavs All 
 
Immigrant 
friends 
Danish 
friends 
Immigrant 
friends 
 
Danish 
friends 
     
Many 20.63 26.82 17.58 16.38 
Quite a 
number 
25.17 33.77 33.56 22.90 
A few 24.17 30.13 29.76 34.35 
None 29.80 9.27 19.11 15.36 
(n) (302)  (1502)  
     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7  Statistics on number of memberships in voluntary associations 
 
 Average no. of 
memberships 
Standard 
deviation Max. Min. n 
Intra-ethnic associations 0.22 0.54 4 0 1503 
Inter-ethnic associations 0.65 0.76 7 0 1503 
Inter-ethnic associations 
(excluding trade unions) 
0.16 0.51 6 0 1502 
 
Table 8  Number of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary 
associations  (in per cent) 
 
No. of 
memberships 
Intra-
ethnic 
Inter-
ethnic 
0 
Inter-
ethnic 
1 
Inter-
ethnic 
2 
Inter-
ethnic 
3 
Inter-
ethnic 
4 
Inter-
ethnic 
5 
Inter-
ethnic 
6 
Inter-
ethnic 
7 
Row 
Total 
           
Count 0 620 537 65 17 1 2 1 0 1243 
Column Percent  86.96 81.61 67.01 68.00 16.67 100.00 100.00 0.00  
Row Percent  49.88 43.20 5.23 1.37 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.00  
Total Percent  41.25 35.73 4.32 1.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.00 82.70 
           
Count 1 73 88 22 7 4 0 0 1 195 
Column Percent  10.24 13.37 22.68 28.00 66.67 0.00 0.00 100.00  
Row Percent  37.44 45.13 11.28 3.59 2.05 0.00 0.00 0.51  
Total Percent  4.86 5.85 1.46 0.47 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.07 12.97 
           
Count 2 19 29 7 0 1 0 0 0 56 
Column Percent  2.66 4.41 7.22 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Row Percent  33.93 51.79 12.50 0.00 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Total Percent  1.26 1.93 0.47 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.73 
           
Count 3 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Column Percent  0.14 0.61 3.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Row Percent  12.50 50.00 37.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Total Percent  0.07 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 
           
Count 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Column Percent  0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Row Percent  0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Total Percent  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
           
Count All Grps 713 658 97 25 6 2 1 1 1503 
Total Percent  47.44 43.78 6.45 1.66 0.40 0.13 0.07 0.07 100 
 
Table 9. Number of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary 
associations, excluding trade unions (in per cent) 
 
No. of 
memberships 
Intra-
ethnic 
Inter-
ethnic 
0 
Inter-
ethnic 
1 
Inter-
ethnic 
2 
Inter-
ethnic 
3 
Inter-
ethnic 
4 
Inter-
ethnic 
5 
Inter-
ethnic 
6 
Row 
Total 
          
Count 0 1129 88 20 2 1 2 0 1242 
Column Percent  85.08 66.17 64.52 28.57 100.00 100.00 0.00  
Row Percent  90.90 7.09 1.61 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.00  
Total Percent  75.17 5.86 1.33 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.00 82.69 
          
Count 1 151 31 8 4 0 0 1 195 
Column Percent  11.38 23.31 25.81 57.14 0.00 0.00 100.00  
Row Percent  77.44 15.90 4.10 2.05 0.00 0.00 0.51  
Total Percent  10.05 2.06 0.53 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.07 12.98 
          
Count 2 43 11 1 1 0 0 0 56 
Column Percent  3.24 8.27 3.23 14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Row Percent  76.79 19.64 1.79 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Total Percent  2.86 0.73 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.73 
          
Count 3 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 8 
Column Percent  0.30 2.26 3.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Row Percent  50.00 37.50 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Total Percent  0.27 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 
          
Count 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Column Percent  0.00 0.00 3.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Row Percent  0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Total Percent  0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Totals All Grps 1327 133 31 7 1 2 1 1502 
Total Percent  88.35 8.85 2.06 0.47 0.07 0.13 0.07 100.00 
 
Table 10  Statistics on association between numbers of memberships in 
intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations 
 
 Pearson’s χ2 M-L χ2 τb τc Spearman’s ρ 
Intra- and 
inter-ethnic 
(all) 
χ2 = 127.75 
df = 28 
p = 0.00 
χ2 =  61.58 
df = 28 
p = 0.00 
 
0.13 
 
0.07 
ρ = 0.14 
t = 5.38 
p = 0.00 
      
Intra- and 
inter-ethnic 
(excluding 
trade unions) 
χ2 =  115.12 
df = 24 
p = 0.00 
χ2 =58.7 
df = 24 
p = 0.00 
 
0.17 
 
0.05 
ρ = 0.18 
t = 6.99 
p = 0.00 
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Table 11  Average number of memberships in intra- and in inter-ethnic voluntary 
associations, by immigrant group 
 
 Turks Pakistanis Somalis Palestinians 
 
Number of 
memberships Intra-ethnic Inter-ethnic Intra-ethnic 
 
Inter-
ethnic Intra-ethnic Inter-ethnic 
 
Intra-
ethnic 
 
Inter-
ethnic 
         
Average 0.29 0.80 0.22 0.72 0.15 0.40 0.25 0.48 
Std. Dev. 0.59 0.71 0.57 0.22 0.46 0.79 0.58 0.78 
(n) (302) (302) (300) (300) (276) (276) (322) (322) 
         
 
 Ex-Yugoslavs All 
 
Number of 
memberships 
Intra-
ethnic Inter-ethnic Intra-ethnic 
 
Inter-
ethnic 
     
Average 0.19 0.83 0.22 0.65 
Std. Dev. 0.47 0.81 0.54 0.76 
(n) (303) (303) (1503) (1503) 
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Notes 
                                                 
i  The hallmark of the Nordic welfare model is its universal character in the sense that basic welfare 
arrangements (such as education, hospital care, social benefits, care of the elderly, and pensions) 
are a citizen’s right defined for the individual and the financing is collective via taxation. 
Therefore, the Nordic countries have the highest average tax burdens and relative shares of the 
public sector among OECD countries (some 50% of GDP) (Andersen, 2004, see also Esping-
Andersen, 1990). 
ii
  Paldam (2004). The contemporary centre-right government in Denmark, for example, is based on 
a firm promise to the voters that the scope of the welfare state will not be reduced (ibid.). 
iii  An example of free-rider behaviour in natives is given by native parents who transfer their 
offspring to a private school, because the proportion of immigrant children in their municipal 
school exceeds some threshold. An example of free-rider behaviour in immigrants is given by 
immigrants who do not invest time and effort in learning the language of their host country. 
iv  Bourdieu (1986) is also considered as one of the ‘fathers’ of the concept (see Svendsen and 
Svendsen, 2003 on ‘Bourdieuconomics’ and the wealth of nations). 
v  Abundant discussions on this issue exist in the literature, for example Offe (1999), Bowles and 
Gintis (2004), Ostrom (1990), Coleman (1987), Svendsen and Svendsen (2003). An assessment 
of Coleman’s relevance for migration studies can be found in Waldinger (1995: 559-60).  
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